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At the 1927 Solvay conference, Albert Einstein presented a thought experiment intended to demon-
strate the incompleteness of the quantum mechanical description of reality. In the following years,
the experiment was modified by Einstein, de Broglie, and several other commentators into a simple
scenario involving the splitting in half of the wave function of a single particle in a box. This paper
collects together several formulations of this thought experiment from the literature, analyzes and
assesses it from the point of view of the Einstein-Bohr debates, the EPR dilemma, and Bell’s the-
orem, and argues for “Einstein’s Boxes” taking its rightful place alongside similar but historically
better known quantum mechanical thought experiments such as EPR and Schro¨dinger’s Cat.
I. INTRODUCTION
It is well known that several of quantum theory’s
founders were dissatisfied with the theory as interpreted
by Niels Bohr and other members of the Copenhagen
school. Before about 1928, for example, Louis de Broglie
advocated what is now called a hidden variable theory: a
pilot-wave version of quantum mechanics in which parti-
cles follow continuous trajectories, guided by a quantum
wave.1 David Bohm’s2 rediscovery and completion of the
pilot-wave theory in 1952 led de Broglie back to these
ideas; Bohm’s theory has continued to inspire interest
in alternatives to the Copenhagen interpretation.3 Erwin
Schro¨dinger was likewise doubtful that the quantum wave
function could alone constitute a complete description of
physical reality. His famous “cat” thought experiment4
was intended to demonstrate quantum theory’s incom-
pleteness by magnifying the allegedly real quantum in-
definiteness up to the macroscopic level where it would
directly conflict with experience.
By far the most important critic of quantum the-
ory, however, was Albert Einstein.6 Several of his early
thought experiments attacking the completeness doctrine
are memorably recounted in Bohr’s reminiscence.7 Ein-
stein’s most important argument against quantum the-
ory’s completeness is the paper (EPR) he co-authored
with Boris Podolsky and Nathan Rosen in 1935.8
The purpose of this paper is to resurrect another
thought experiment which, like EPR and Schro¨dinger’s
cat, is intended to argue against the orthodox doctrine of
quantum completeness. This thought experiment – “Ein-
stein Boxes”9 – is due originally to Einstein, although it
has also been discussed and reformulated by de Broglie,
Schro¨dinger, Heisenberg, and others.
Given its unique simplicity, clarity, and elegance, the
relative obscurity of this thought experiment is unjusti-
fied. Although generally aiming to establish the same
dilemma as that posed in the EPR paper,8 Einstein’s
Boxes establishes this conclusion with a more straight-
forward logical argument. Our hope is that this paper
will aid in re-injecting this old thought experiment into
the ongoing discussions of the significance and implica-
tions of EPR, the completeness doctrine, and alternatives
to Copenhagen such as Bohm’s non-local hidden variable
theory. Because of its remarkable simplicity, the Einstein
Boxes thought experiment also is well-suited as an intro-
duction to these topics for students and other interested
non-experts.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II we intro-
duce Einstein’s Boxes by quoting a detailed description
due to de Broglie. We compare it to the EPR argument
and discuss how it fares in eluding Bohr’s rebuttal of
EPR. In Sec. III we present and discuss Einstein’s original
version of the thought experiment as well as some of his
related comments regarding the boxes and their connec-
tion to EPR. In Sec. IV we present a new, Bell-inspired
formulation of Einstein’s Boxes and relate the ideas to
Bell’s celebrated theorem about hidden variable theories.
Section V begins with some comments of Heisenberg on
the thought experiment, considers an experimentally re-
alized version of it, and assesses some of Heisenberg’s
statements on non-locality. In Sec. VI we conclude with
a general discussion.
II. EPR AND DE BROGLIE’S VERSION OF
THE BOXES
In a 1964 book de Broglie gave a detailed statement of
the Einstein’s Boxes thought experiment.10
“Suppose a particle is enclosed in a box B
with impermeable walls. The associated wave
Ψ is confined to the box and cannot leave it.
The usual interpretation asserts that the par-
ticle is “potentially” present in the whole of
the box B, with a probability |Ψ|2 at each
point. Let us suppose that by some process
or other, for example, by inserting a parti-
tion into the box, the box B is divided into
two separate parts B1 and B2 and that B1
and B2 are then transported to two very dis-
tant places, for example to Paris and Tokyo.
[See Fig. 1.] The particle, which has not yet
appeared, thus remains potentially present in
the assembly of the two boxes and its wave
function Ψ consists of two parts, one of which,
2FIG. 1: A single particle is confined to the box B, into which
a barrier is inserted thus splitting the box and the particle’s
wave function in two. The two half boxes (B1 and B2) are
then separated, at which point the boxes may be opened and
their contents examined.
Ψ1, is located in B1 and the other, Ψ2, in
B2. The wave function is thus of the form
Ψ = c1Ψ1 + c2Ψ2, where |c1|2 + |c2|2 = 1.
“The probability laws of wave mechanics now
tell us that if an experiment is carried out in
box B1 in Paris, which will enable the pres-
ence of the particle to be revealed in this box,
the probability of this experiment giving a
positive result is |c1|2, whilst the probability
of it giving a negative result is |c2|2. Accord-
ing to the usual interpretation, this would
have the following significance: because the
particle is present in the assembly of the two
boxes prior to the observable localization, it
would be immediately localized in box B1 in
the case of a positive result in Paris. This
does not seem to me to be acceptable. The
only reasonable interpretation appears to me
to be that prior to the observable localization
in B1, we know that the particle was in one
of the two boxes B1 and B2, but we do not
know in which one, and the probabilities con-
sidered in the usual wave mechanics are the
consequence of this partial ignorance. If we
show that the particle is in box B1, it implies
simply that it was already there prior to lo-
calization. Thus, we now return to the clear
classical concept of probability, which springs
from our partial ignorance of the true situa-
tion. But, if this point of view is accepted,
the description of the particle given by the
customary wave function Ψ, though leading
to a perfectly exact description of probabili-
ties, does not give us a complete description of
the physical reality, because the particle must
have been localized prior to the observation
which revealed it, and the wave function Ψ
gives no information about this.
“We might note here how the usual interpre-
tation leads to a paradox in the case of exper-
iments with a negative result. Suppose that
the particle is charged, and that in the boxB2
in Tokyo a device has been installed which en-
ables the whole of the charged particle located
in the box to be drained off and in so doing to
establish an observable localization. Now, if
nothing is observed, this negative result will
signify that the particle is not in box B2 and
it is thus in box B1 in Paris. But this can
reasonably signify only one thing: the parti-
cle was already in Paris in box B1 prior to
the drainage experiment made in Tokyo in
box B2. Every other interpretation is absurd.
How can we imagine that the simple fact of
having observed nothing in Tokyo has been
able to promote the localization of the parti-
cle at a distance of many thousands of miles
away?”11
Although de Broglie did not make his reasoning ex-
plicit, he gives some hints that allow us to plausibly re-
construct the intended logical structure of this argument
for incompleteness. The rhetorical question at the end
implies that de Broglie thinks it is impossible (“absurd”)
for the negative result of a measurement in Tokyo to have
a decisive causal effect on the contents of the box in Paris.
Likewise for a positive result: “If we show that the par-
ticle is in box B1, it implies simply that it was already
there prior to localization,” and therefore, by implication,
that it was already not in box B2 before the observa-
tion. Generalizing, the measurement at B1 cannot have
affected the contents of the box B2, and therefore the
contents of B2 (which are known after inspection of B1)
must have been already definite before that inspection.
According to at least one commonly held version of
the orthodox interpretation, however, it is the very act
of observation that disturbs the physical system in ques-
tion and brings about a definite result. Why should de
Broglie think that the act of opening B1 and examining
its contents can’t affect the contents of B2? Because B2
is spatially distant. Its contents could not be affected by
any reasonable physical mechanism by something done
to the well-separated B1. That is evidently the point of
taking one box to Paris and the other to Tokyo before
opening them.
There is thus a locality or separability assumption at
work here. Given that B2 is physically separated from
B1 by a great distance, nothing we do to B1 can af-
fect the contents of B2. (Indeed, we could consider the
contents of B2 at space-time coordinates that lie outside
the light cone of the observation event at B1. Then any
“disturbance” by the measurement at B1 on B2’s con-
tents would evidently violate relativity’s prohibition on
superluminal causation.) So when we open B1 and de-
termine its contents, we learn immediately whether or
3not B2 contains the particle. And because B2’s contents
cannot have been in any way affected by the opening of
B1, B2 must have either contained or not contained the
particle all along. And, finally, because “the wave func-
tion Ψ gives no information about” the particle’s actual
pre-measurement location (in particular, Ψ attributes no
definite particle content to B2), that description must
have been incomplete.
De Broglie seems to have had this reasoning in mind.
Notably, it is structurally identical to the argument of the
more famous EPR paper.8 EPR begins with a 2-particle
wave function
ψ(x1, x2) = δ(x1 − x2 − a) =
∫
dk eik(x1−x2−a), (1)
which is a simultaneous eigenstate of the relative posi-
tion operator (xˆ1 − xˆ2) (with eigenvalue a) and of the
total momentum operator (pˆ1 + pˆ2) (with eigenvalue 0).
The authors also assume the two particles to be suffi-
ciently well-separated that any measurement performed
on particle 1 can have no physical effect on particle 2.
They then argue as follows: if the experimenter chooses
to measure the position of particle 1, he will immedi-
ately be able to infer the position of particle 2; should he
choose instead to measure the momentum of particle 1,
he may immediately infer the momentum of particle 2.
Therefore, because nothing the experimenter does in the
region near particle 1 can affect particle 2 in any way,
both the position and momentum of particle 2 must al-
ready have had definite values prior to any measurement.
Both quantities are “elements of reality” according to the
famous EPR criterion of reality: “If, without in any way
disturbing a system, we can predict with certainty (that
is, with probability equal to unity) the value of a physical
quantity, then there exists an element of physical reality
corresponding to this physical quantity.”8
Having also defined a necessary condition for the com-
pleteness of a theory (“every element of the physical re-
ality must have a counterpart in the physical theory”8),
EPR concluded that the quantum mechanical description
is incomplete because it doesn’t permit simultaneous at-
tribution of definite position and momentum values to
particle 2.
Niels Bohr is widely believed to have refuted the EPR
argument by pointing out an “essential ambiguity” in
EPR’s criterion of reality.12 The alleged ambiguity was
contained in EPR’s phrase “without in any way disturb-
ing a system.” In his response, Bohr appears to concede
EPR’s locality/separability principle when he writes that
“there is in a case like that just considered no question
of a mechanical disturbance of the system under inves-
tigation during the last critical stage of the measuring
procedure.” However: “even at this stage there is essen-
tially the question of an influence on the very conditions
which define the possible types of predictions regarding
the future behavior of the system. Because these con-
ditions constitute an inherent element of the description
of any phenomenon to which the term ‘physical reality’
can be properly attached, we see that the argumentation
of the mentioned authors does not justify their conclu-
sion that quantum-mechanical description is essentially
incomplete.”12
Bohr seems to have meant13 that although we do not
“mechanically” disturb the second particle by measuring
the position or momentum of particle 1, we do enact a
decisive choice when we decide which quantity to mea-
sure. For whichever quantity we decide to actually mea-
sure, we forgo the possibility of subsequently learning
the value of the complementary variable in the distant
particle. Bohr discusses this decisive choice in terms of
the need for a “discrimination between different exper-
imental procedures which allow of the unambiguous use
of complementary classical concepts.”12 Bohr is evidently
referring to the mutually exclusive experimental arrange-
ments needed to measure the position and momentum of
particle 1.
In short, although we can choose to learn about the
position of particle 2 or the momentum of particle 2, we
cannot with any single experimental arrangement learn
about both the position and the momentum. And, says
Bohr, this fact demonstrates the invalidity of EPR’s si-
multaneous use of the two concepts in regard to par-
ticle 2: the experimental arrangement which warrants
use of one concept makes the other simply inapplicable.
Bohr believed that this “complementarity” perspective
allows one to consistently maintain that the “quantum-
mechanical description of physical phenomena ... fulfill[s]
... all rational demands of completeness.”12 That is, it
eludes the EPR argument from locality to incomplete-
ness.
Although widely accepted in the physics community,
the adequacy of Bohr’s reply to EPR has been questioned
many times by those who have carefully scrutinized the
issue.14 We will not fully engage this long-standing dis-
pute, but we can shed some fresh light on the debate
over the validity of EPR’s conclusion by returning to Ein-
stein’s Boxes and seeing how this simpler thought exper-
iment fares in escaping what appears to have been the
main thrust of Bohr’s response to EPR.
It seems reasonable to infer from de Broglie’s for-
mulation of the Boxes argument (quoted above) that
de Broglie meant to assert the existence of a pre-
measurement “element of reality” corresponding to the
contents of (at least) the distant box, B2, and that he
would argue for its existence on the basis of the EPR cri-
terion of reality: “without in any way disturbing” boxB2,
we can determine whether it contains a complete particle
or nothing. The presence or non-presence of the particle
in B2 is therefore an element of reality even before the
box B1 is opened and its contents examined. Finally,
because the initial quantum mechanical wave function Ψ
attributed neither (definite) state to box B2, there is at
least one element of reality which fails to “have a coun-
terpart in the physical theory.” And therefore quantum
theory is incomplete by precisely the EPR completeness
criterion.
4The logic of this elaboration of de Broglie’s argument
exactly matches the logic of the EPR paper. But be-
cause the Boxes thought experiment in no way relies
on a choice between two complementary quantities to
measure,15 it seems immune from Bohr’s criticism that
there is a kind of “semantic disturbance”16 effected by
this choice. There is no question with the Boxes experi-
ment about which quantity will be measured. We are go-
ing to open B1 and look for the particle there, period. So
there appears to be no room for “an influence on the very
conditions which define the possible types of predictions
regarding the future behavior of the system.”12 Given the
assumption of locality/separability (with which Bohr ap-
pears to agree given his denial of a “mechanical distur-
bance”), the Einstein’s Boxes thought experiment estab-
lishes the conclusion of incompleteness (that is, it estab-
lishes the dilemma between locality and completeness)
in a straightforward way that seems immune to Bohr’s
criticism of EPR.
III. EINSTEIN AND THE BOXES
Although it is not specifically formulated in terms
of a particle being split between a pair of boxes, Ein-
stein presented a thought experiment at the 1927 Solvay
Conference17,18 on which de Broglie’s later formulation
was based. The experiment involves a particle inci-
dent on a diaphragm with a single aperture, behind
which lies a large, hemispherical detection screen. (See
Fig. 2.) With a sufficiently narrow aperture, the inci-
dent electrons will diffract, resulting in essentially spher-
ical Schro¨dinger waves propagating toward the screen. If
a single electron is sent through the aperture, the elec-
tron will eventually be detected at some distinct point
on the screen. Einstein’s comments focus on the appar-
ent conflict between the spreading spherical wave and the
distinct point of eventual detection.
Einstein described two possible interpretations of this
scenario. According to Interpretation 1, “The de Broglie-
Schro¨dinger waves do not correspond to a single electron,
but to a cloud of electrons extended in space. The the-
ory does not give any information about the individual
processes, but only about the ensemble of an infinity of
elementary processes.” In Interpretation 2, “The theory
has the pretension to be a complete theory of individual
processes.”19
Implicit in Interpretation 1 is the idea that each par-
ticle follows some definite trajectory from the slit to the
screen; the spreading of the wave merely indicates igno-
rance about the exact identity of this trajectory for any
particular particle. The wave represents a kind of en-
semble average over a large number of such individual
trajectories. The standard Born rule can then be un-
derstood as follows: |Ψ|2 gives the probability that any
particular electron in this (real or imagined) ensemble in
fact has (just prior to detection) a given location. Thus,
according to Interpretation 1, the description in terms of
FIG. 2: Einstein’s original version of the boxes thought ex-
periment: particles incident from the left penetrate a narrow
aperture, where they diffract, resulting in essentially spheri-
cal Schro¨dinger waves propagating toward the hemispherical
detection screen.
wave and Born rule probabilities is incomplete because it
fails to describe the actual path taken by each individual
particle between the slit and the screen.
Interpretation 2, on the other hand, denies that each
individual electron has a definite trajectory. Instead,
each electron is assumed to be spread out in a way that
is accurately described by the spherical wave. This inter-
pretation was probably meant to capture the view held
by Schro¨dinger at the time,20 according to which |Ψ|2
represented an actual charge density for an individual
electron. It also is a fair description of the views of Jor-
dan and (the later) Heisenberg who held that, prior to the
moment of detection, there existed a spatially dispersed
potentiality for particle localization, these potentialities
being triggered into realities by the eventual interaction
with a measurement device.21
As Einstein went on to point out, however, the par-
ticle is in fact always found at a definite point on the
screen. Thus, at the moment it is detected there, the
Schro¨dinger wave (representing charge density or some
kind of irreducible potentiality for particle localization)
must suddenly collapse to zero at all other points on the
screen. And, as long as we hold (with Interpretation
2) that the initially spherical wave accurately and com-
pletely captures the physical reality of the propagating
particle, this collapse evidently involves a kind of action-
at-a-distance.
Max Jammer summarizes Einstein’s objection to Inter-
pretation 2 as follows: “If |ψ|2 is interpreted [this way],
5then, as long as no localization has been effected, the
particle must be considered as potentially present with
almost constant probability over the whole area of the
screen; however, as soon as it is localized, a peculiar
action-at-a-distance must be assumed to take place which
prevents the continuously distributed wave in space from
producing an effect at two places on the screen.”22 This
possibility will be further explored in Sec. IV.
Einstein continued23: “It seems to me that this dif-
ficulty cannot be overcome unless the description of the
process in terms of the Schro¨dinger wave is supplemented
by some detailed specification of the localization of the
particle during its propagation. I think M. de Broglie
[who, recall, was toying with the pilot-wave theory at
this time] is right in searching in this direction. If one
works only with Schro¨dinger waves, the Interpretation 2
of |ψ|2, I think, contradicts the postulate of relativity.”
The relevant aspect of the “postulate of relativity” is
of course precisely the locality/separability assumption
mentioned previously: there can be no causal dependence
between two space-like separated events. Relativity thus
prohibits the action-at-a-distance entailed by Interpreta-
tion 2.
Summarizing, Einstein thought that any possible in-
terpretation in which the wave function was regarded as
a complete description of physical reality would have to
entertain unacceptable (relativity-violating) action-at-a-
distance associated with the collapse of the wave func-
tion on measurement. Thus he rejected Interpretation 2
in favor of Interpretation 1, according to which the wave
function was an incomplete description of individual pro-
cesses, to be (presumably) completed with something like
de Broglie’s pilot-wave model.
Just like the (later) EPR argument, this simple
thought experiment was intended to pose a dilemma be-
tween locality and completeness: if the wave function
represents a complete description of physical reality, then
physical reality contains relativity-violating action-at-a-
distance. Or equivalently, if we insist on respecting rel-
ativity’s prohibition, we must regard the quantum me-
chanical description of reality as incomplete.
As is hopefully now clear, de Broglie’s re-formulation of
the thought experiment in terms of literal boxes simply
exaggerates the spatial separation of two parts of the
total wave function, and thus brings out more clearly the
implications of the locality assumption. But the essential
structure of the argument de Broglie presents is identical
to the original Einstein argument of 1927.
Some years after the 1927 Solvay Conference, Einstein
did discuss the specific scenario involving a single particle
divided between two half-boxes, although he used the
boxes as merely a classical analog to clarify his definitions
of locality and completeness. The discussion occurred in
a 1935 letter to Schro¨dinger, written shortly after the
publication of the EPR paper. As Arthur Fine24 pointed
out, in this letter Einstein disclosed that Podolsky, not
Einstein, wrote the EPR paper and that he (Einstein)
was disappointed with how it turned out: the main point
had been “smothered by the formalism.”25 Let us see how
Einstein reworked the EPR argument in this letter, and
also examine the role played therein by the boxes.
Einstein began the letter by clarifying what he meant
by locality and completeness. He asked Schro¨dinger to
consider a classical particle (a ball) confined to a box. A
partition is then inserted, and the two half-boxes are car-
ried to distant locations where they are separately opened
and their contents examined. As in his discussion at the
Solvay Conference, Einstein surveyed two possible ways
of analyzing this experiment:
“Now I describe a state of affairs as follows:
The probability is 1/2 that the ball is in the
first box. Is this a complete description?
NO: A complete description is: the ball is (or
is not) in the first box. That is how the char-
acterization of the state of affairs must appear
in a complete description.
YES: Before I open them, the ball is by no
means in one of the two boxes. Being in a
definite box only comes about when I lift the
covers. This is what brings about the statisti-
cal character of the world of experience, or its
empirical lawfulness. Before lifting the covers
the state [of the distant box] is completely
characterized by the number 1/2, whose sig-
nificance as statistical findings, to be sure, is
only attested to when carrying out observa-
tions. Statistics only arise because observa-
tion involves insufficiently known factors for-
eign to the system being described.”26
Note that the NO and YES alternatives map exactly
onto Interpretation 1 and Interpretation 2 from the 1927
discussion. According to the NO view (and Interpreta-
tion 1), the description of the state of the system in terms
of probabilities is incomplete, there being, in reality, an
actual fact of the matter about the location (trajectory)
of the particle. According to the YES view (and Inter-
pretation 2), the description in terms of probabilities is
complete because the actual fact of the matter regarding
the location of the ball (particle) only comes into exis-
tence with the act of measurement.
For the case of a classical particle like the ball, the
YES view is not very plausible, and Einstein asserts
that “the man on the street would only take the first
. . . interpretation seriously.”27 But for a single electron,
the YES view is essentially the completeness claim of the
Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics. Ein-
stein didn’t accept this view and wanted to argue that the
first view (NO) was the correct one not only for the classi-
cal particle but for the electron as well. But he recognized
that merely arguing from the classical analogy wasn’t ad-
equate, and went on in the letter to Schro¨dinger (and in
several other places28 over the subsequent decades) to
construct a complete argument.
The necessary additional premise — one that was
taken for granted for the case of the ball but needed
6to be made explicit to make the argument rigorous for
the electron — was the locality/separability assumption.
Howard29 translates Einstein, again from the same 1935
letter: “My way of thinking is now this: properly consid-
ered, one cannot [refute the completeness doctrine, Inter-
pretation 2] if one does not make use of a supplementary
principle: the ‘separation principle.’ That is to say: ‘the
second box, along with everything having to do with its
contents is independent of what happens with regard to
the first box (separated partial systems).’ If one adheres
to the separation principle, then one thereby excludes
the second . . . point of view, and only the [first] point
of view remains, according to which the above state de-
scription is an incomplete description of reality, or of the
real states.”
Einstein continues: “The preceding analogy [that is,
the ball-in-boxes scenario] corresponds only very imper-
fectly to the quantum mechanical example in the [EPR]
paper. It is, however, designed to make clear the point of
view that is essential to me. In quantum mechanics one
describes a real state of affairs of a system by means of
a normed function ψ of the coordinates (of configuration
space). The temporal evolution is uniquely determined
by the Schro¨dinger equation. One would now very much
like to say the following: ψ stands in a one-to-one cor-
respondence with the real state of the real system. The
statistical character of measurement outcomes is exclu-
sively due to the measuring apparatus, or the process of
measurement. If this works, I talk about a complete de-
scription of reality by the theory. However, if such an
interpretation doesn’t work out, then I call the theoreti-
cal description ‘incomplete’.”30
Note that Einstein defines “completeness” here as a
one-to-one correspondence between quantum wave func-
tions and real states of real systems. This definition is
somewhat different from the one (cited in Sec. II) used
in the EPR paper; Arthur Fine refers to it as “bijective
completeness” in contrast to “EPR completeness.”31
Einstein then dropped the ball-in-boxes example and
returned to the original EPR scenario involving two en-
tangled particles. He reconstructed the EPR logic as a
simple argument from the separation principle to a failure
of bijective completeness, modeled after the discussion of
the boxes. The argument is the following: consider the
entangled state of the two particles discussed in EPR. Be-
fore the measurement on particle 1, the entangled wave
function attributes to particle 2 no definite position and
no definite momentum. After a measurement on 1 (what-
ever is measured), the wave function collapses and parti-
cle 2 is in a state of some definite position or some definite
momentum or perhaps some other quantity altogether –
which state of course depends on what kind of measure-
ment is made on particle 1 and what its outcome is. But
that aspect (which to Bohr seemed so central to the EPR
argument) is now completely irrelevant. All that mat-
ters is that the wave function associated with the second
particle has changed in a situation where (by the sepa-
ration principle) the actual physical state of particle 2
has not changed. That it happens to change to a state
function that can (according to the standard eigenstate-
eigenvalue link) be interpreted as attributing a definite
value for some property (an “element of reality”) is sim-
ply irrelevant.32
According to Einstein “Now what is essential is exclu-
sively that [the wave functions relating to the distant par-
ticle] are in general different from one another. I assert
that this difference is incompatible with the hypothesis
that the ψ description is correlated one-to-one with the
physical reality (the real state). After the collision, the
real state of [the two particle system] consists precisely
of the real state of [particle 1] and the real state of [par-
ticle 2], which two states have nothing to do with one
another. The real state of [particle 2] thus cannot depend
upon the kind of measurement I carry out on [particle 1].
(‘Separation hypothesis’ from above.) But then for the
same state of [particle 2] there are two (in general arbi-
trarily many) equally justified ψ[2], which contradicts the
hypothesis of a one-to-one or complete description of the
real states.”33
In summary, by the separation principle, the real,
physical state of particle 2 is unaffected by the mea-
surement at 1. Yet according to the collapse postulate,
the wave function associated with particle 2 changes. At
most one of the two wave functions can constitute a com-
plete description. Thus the quantum mechanical descrip-
tion is shown to be, in the general case, incomplete.
Although Einstein dropped the ball-in-boxes thought
experiment (and returned to the two-particle entangled
state of EPR) when presenting this reformulated argu-
ment from locality to incompleteness, he need not have
done so. Despite his statement that the ball-in-boxes
analogy “corresponds only very imperfectly to the quan-
tum mechanical example in the [EPR] paper,” the EPR
dilemma can be established equally well with a quantum
mechanical version of the boxes.
Consider the quantum state of the single particle whose
wave function has been split between two spatial loca-
tions (boxes):
ψ =
1√
2
(ψ1 + ψ2), (2)
where ψ1,2 are completely localized in two well-separated
regions of space (B1,2). According to the standard recipe,
if and when a position measurement is made on the par-
ticle, its wave function immediately collapses to zero at
every point except the place where the particle was found.
Applying this recipe here, imagine that we open box B1
and find the particle there. At this moment, the wave
function in B2 immediately goes to zero (indicating that
there is no longer any probability of finding the parti-
cle there). But according to the locality premise, the
actual physical state of B2 (whatever that might have
been) cannot have changed. Hence, we have two dif-
ferent quantum mechanical descriptions (in particular,
wave functions with different values in B2) of the same
one unchanged physical contents of B2 – a clear failure
7of Einstein’s (bijective) completeness criterion.
This reformulation of Einstein’s argument for incom-
pleteness using the ball-in-boxes scenario is astonishingly
simple compared to the EPR argument for the same con-
clusion. Our reformulation highlights that, unlike our re-
construction of de Broglie’s boxes argument and unlike
the argument presented in EPR, the argument from lo-
cality to incompleteness need not rely on actually deter-
mining the identity of any elements of reality (by means
of the EPR criterion of reality). In the EPR scenario in-
volving the two entangled particles, there is an almost ir-
resistible tendency to attempt to establish definite prop-
erties for the distant particle; after all, there is a particle
there that one is tempted to think has those properties.
With the (one particle) Einstein’s Boxes argument, how-
ever, the contents of the distant box are less clear, and
the temptation to attribute definite properties is conse-
quently reduced – which is a good thing, from the point of
view of emphasizing that it does not matter to the argu-
ment what the contents of the box are. All that matters is
that according to the locality principle, whatever is there
doesn’t change as a result of the measurement performed
in B1. That alone is sufficient to establish the conclusion
that Einstein’s bijective completeness criterion fails for
(an assumed local) quantum theory.
It also bears repeating that Einstein’s actual argument
in terms of the pair of previously interacting particles
and the reformulation here in terms of the ball-in-boxes
scenario both completely avoid any mention of the non-
commuting observables that seemed (to Bohr at least)
to play such a large role in the actual EPR paper. It is
intriguing to speculate about how Bohr would have re-
sponded to this simplified version of the argument for in-
completeness. We won’t, however, undertake such specu-
lation here. Suffice it to credit Einstein’s Boxes for help-
ing to un-smother Einstein’s true arguments against the
quantum completeness doctrine.
Although Einstein strongly believed in the local-
ity/separability premise of this argument and therefore
regarded it as an argument for incompleteness, he real-
ized that, strictly speaking, what the argument estab-
lishes is only that, for quantum mechanics, locality en-
tails incompleteness. That is, quantum mechanics must
give up either the completeness claim or the locality prin-
ciple:
“By this way of looking at the matter it be-
comes evident that the paradox forces us to
relinquish one of the following two assertions:
1. the description by means of the ψ-function is
complete.
2. the real states of spatially separated objects
are independent of each other.
On the other hand, it is possible to adhere
to (2) if one regards the ψ-function as the
description of a (statistical) ensemble of sys-
tems (and therefore relinquishes (1)). How-
ever, this view blasts the framework of the
‘orthodox quantum theory’.”34
Or as Arthur Fine eloquently summarizes this point: “It
is important to notice that the conclusion Einstein draws
from EPR is not a categorical claim for the incomplete-
ness of quantum theory. It is rather that the theory poses
a dilemma between completeness and separation; both
cannot be true.”35
Perhaps this elaboration of the logic of Einstein’s argu-
ment against the completeness doctrine — especially the
simplified version involving the boxes — helps explain
why Einstein never believed that Bohr (or anyone else)
had adequately addressed the dilemma between locality
and completeness posed in EPR.36
IV. BELL AND THE BOXES
In the last paper of his tragically short life, J. S. Bell
prefaced a discussion and derivation of his celebrated in-
equality with a classical analogy reminiscent of Einstein’s
boxes. Bell wrote:
“Most physicists were (and are) unimpressed
by [the correlations exhibited in the EPR sce-
nario]. That is because most physicists do not
really accept, deep down, that the wavefunc-
tion is the whole story. They tend to think
that the analogy of the glove left at home is
a good one. If I find that I have brought only
one glove, and that it is right-handed, then I
predict confidently that the one still at home
will be seen to be left handed. But suppose
we had been told, on good authority, that
gloves are neither right- or left-handed when
not looked at. Then that, by looking at one,
we could predetermine the result of looking
at the other, at some remote place, would be
remarkable. Finding that this is so in prac-
tice, we would very soon invent the idea that
gloves are already one thing or the other even
when not looked at. And we would begin to
doubt the authorities that had assured us oth-
erwise. That common-sense position was that
taken by Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen, in re-
spect of correlations in quantum mechanics.
They decided that the wavefunction, making
no distinction whatever between one possibil-
ity and another, could not be the whole story.
And they conjectured that a more complete
story would be locally causal.
“However it has turned out that quantum me-
chanics can not be ‘completed’ into a locally
causal theory, at least as long as one allows,
as Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen did, freely
operating experimenters. The analogy of the
gloves is not a good one. Common sense does
not work here.”37
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orem, in the context of Bohm’s version of the EPR
argument.38 In this version, it is different spin compo-
nents of the two particles, rather than their positions
and momenta, which play the role of quantum mechani-
cally non-commuting variables which an EPR-like argu-
ment suggests may nevertheless possess simultaneously
definite values.
Assuming a non- (or super-) quantum-mechanical the-
ory in which each particle in the EPR pair carries with
it a set of hidden variables (an “instruction set”) telling
it how to respond when encountering variously oriented
polarizers (that is, a theory with hidden elements of re-
ality of precisely the kind suggested by the EPR-Bohm
thought experiment), Bell imposes a locality constraint
according to which the outcome of the measurement on
each side must depend only on the variables in the par-
ticles’ instruction set and the orientation of the local ap-
paratus. The dependence of each outcome on the setting
of the distant apparatus or the distant outcome is ex-
cluded. The mathematical consequence is an inequality
restricting the average correlations between the outcomes
of measurements on the two particles.
This kind of inequality is violated by the quantum me-
chanical predictions and, it seems, by real particles in
real experiments.39 This violation means that one (or
more) of the assumptions made in deriving the inequal-
ity must be false. The two assumptions typically called
into question are the assumption of hidden variables and
the assumed lack of (relativity-violating) causal depen-
dence of the outcomes on distant settings and distant
outcomes. And choosing one of these assumptions to
blame has generally been considered no dilemma at all;
relativity’s prohibition on super-luminal causation is a
central pillar of modern physics, so “obviously” the cor-
rect choice is to reject the assumption of hidden variables.
Thus, the empirical violations of Bell’s inequalities seem
to be regarded by most physicists as the best argument
against the hidden variables program and for the com-
pleteness doctrine.
For example, N. David Mermin40 wrote that violations
of Bell’s inequalities “fatally undermine the position of
EPR” meaning, presumably, EPR’s claim that a (hidden
variable) completion of quantum theory might be possi-
ble. Daniel Styer, answering an alleged “misconception
regarding quantum mechanics”41, stated that “The ap-
pealing view that a state vector describes an ensemble
of classical systems [and therefore an incomplete descrip-
tion of individual systems] was rendered untenable by
tests of Bell’s theorem which show that no determinis-
tic model, no matter how complicated, can give rise to
all the results of quantum mechanics.” (Bohm’s theory
of course provides a straightforward counterexample to
this claim, unless Styer intends the tacit premise that
the deterministic model must respect locality.) Asher
Peres and Daniel R. Terno42 assert that “Bell’s theo-
rem does not imply the existence of any non-locality in
quantum mechanics itself;” only “classical imitations of
quantum mechanics” suffer inevitable non-locality. And
Eugene Wigner wrote: “In my opinion, the most con-
vincing argument against the theory of hidden variables
was presented by J. S. Bell.”43
In summary, it is almost universally believed that ex-
perimental violations of Bell’s inequalities imply fatal
problems with attempts to “complete” quantum theory
by adding hidden variables, but pose no particular prob-
lem or puzzle for quantum mechanics itself. This atti-
tude evidently accounts for the fact that very few physi-
cists are presently interested in the hidden variables pro-
gram. It also explains why equally few worry that there is
any deep contradiction between standard quantum the-
ory and relativity.
Bell himself, however, did not see it this way. Like Ein-
stein, Bell believed that quantum mechanics itself faced a
problematic dilemma between completeness and locality.
We will discuss the logical implications of this shortly,
in particular, the implications of combining the EPR
(or Einstein’s Boxes) locality-completeness dilemma with
Bell’s theorem.
First, let us give one final version of the argument for
this dilemma by applying Bell’s reasoning to the boxes
scenario. Instead of applying this reasoning to an EPR-
motivated hidden variable theory (like Bell did), however,
we will assume orthodox quantum mechanics, complete-
ness doctrine and all, as our working theory. What we
will see is that by using reasoning similar to Bell’s, we
can arrive, not at a conclusion equivalent to Bell’s fa-
mous theorem, but rather at a new argument for the
EPR dilemma: quantum mechanics is either incomplete
or non-local.
Let us begin by assuming that the initial wave function,
λ =
1√
2
(ψ1 + ψ2), (3)
is a complete description of the physical reality of the
pre-measurement situation. (As before, ψ1 and ψ2 repre-
sent states in which the particle is localized respectively
in B1 and B2. Note too that we have used the variable
λ rather than ψ to denote the pre-measurement wave
function. This choice is meant to highlight the similarity
to Bell’s derivation, in which λ is traditionally used to
denote a complete specification of the pre-measurement
state of the two particles including any necessary hidden
variables. Here, however, we are assuming with Bohr
that the wave function alone provides a complete speci-
fication of the pre-measurement contents of the boxes.)
Let N1 = {0, 1} represent the number of particles
found in box B1 when it is opened; similarly for N2.
The Born rule implies the following expressions for the
probabilities of finding N1 = 1 (when/if B1 is opened and
examined) and of finding N2 = 1 (when/if B2 is opened
and examined):
P (N1=1 |λ) = 1
2
, (4)
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P (N2=1 |λ) = 1
2
. (5)
Finally, let us calculate the probability for a double de-
tection, that is, the probability that the particle is found
in both of the two half-boxes when they are opened. Call
this probability P (N1=1 & N2=1). If we follow exactly
Bell’s reasoning in deriving an inequality for hidden vari-
able theories, we can (by Bayes’ formula44) decompose
the joint probability into a product as:
P (N1 = 1 & N2=1 |λ)
= P (N1=1 |λ) · P (N2=1 |N1=1, λ). (6)
Now, quoting Bell: “Invoking local causality, and the
assumed completeness of . . . λ . . . , we declare redundant
certain of the conditional variables in the last expression,
because they are at space-like separation from the result
in question.”44 In our situation, this same local causality
requirement implies that
P (N2=1 |N1=1, λ) = P (N2=1 |λ), (7)
because, as Bell says, the outcome event at B1 (N1 = 1)
is (let us assume) at a space-like separation from the
event in question (N2 = 1) at B2. Thus, the probability
of this event at B2 should not depend on the outcome
N1 = 1; it should instead depend only on those variables
(λ) that described (by assumption, completely) the pre-
measurement contents of the boxes.
Thus, the probability of double-detection simplifies to
P (N1 = 1&N2=1 |λ) (8)
= P (N1=1 |λ) · P (N2=1 |λ).
If we substitute the two 50% probabilities on the right-
hand side, we evidently find that a double-detection
should occur with probability 25%. That is, one quar-
ter of the time, we should find the particle in both boxes.
One expects, of course, that this will never happen.
(Such an occurrence would violate several fundamental
conservation principles.) Therefore one (or more) of the
assumptions leading to this prediction must be wrong.
In particular, it seems that we must reject either the
assumption of locality or the assumption of completeness
– the same dilemma established earlier using the boxes
in a different way.45
The reader might object that we neglected to collapse
the wave function and thus erred in treating the second
measurement as based on the same quantum state (λ) as
the first. As Einstein pointed out in 1927,22, it is pre-
cisely the collapse postulate which prevents a single par-
ticle, whose wave function before measurement is spread
out over some finite region of space, from being detected
at two different places at once.
Our claim, however, is that this collapse violates the
locality assumption if the wave function description is re-
garded as complete. If the physical contents of the second
box do not change as a result of the measurement on the
first box, and if these physical contents are completely de-
scribed by the wave function λ, then the associated (Born
rule) probability cannot change as a result of the outcome
of the distant experiment. That is precisely Bell’s local-
ity assumption. To demand the use of a new, collapsed
wave function for the second box (one that takes into ac-
count the information gathered when the first box was
opened) is to concede that the description provided by
the initial wave function was incomplete.
If the reader finds this response unconvincing, imagine
that the same objection was leveled against the parallel
assumption in Bell’s theorem by an advocate of a sup-
posedly local hidden variable theory. Such an advocate
might object to Bell on the grounds that, after the first
measurement is made (on particle A say), the state speci-
fication of particle B should be allowed to re-adjust to be
in accord with the outcome of (that is, the information
obtained during) the experiment on A. “The experimen-
tal violation of Bell’s inequalities,” such a person might
say, “in no way proves that my local hidden variable the-
ory is untenable. For Bell unjustifiably assumed that the
probabilities for various outcomes atB could depend only
on the physical state attributed to B before the measure-
ment at A. But in my local hidden variable theory, the
state attributed to B, and therefore the probability for
a particular outcome at B, depends on the result of the
measurement at A. Thus Bell’s constraint does not apply
and my theory is saved.”
The correct response to such an argument would be
to simply deny that this sort of theory is local. A state
attribution for B that changes as a result of the measure-
ment outcome at A is precisely the kind of non-locality
Bell’s locality assumption is meant to exclude. But this
response applies equally well to quantum theory itself, if
we are assuming that quantum theory provides, with the
wave function alone, a complete description of physical
reality. Recalling Bell’s reasoning, it is precisely the as-
sumption of “the assumed completeness of . . . λ” that
warrants the removal of the A-side outcome from the list
of variables on which the B-side result is conditioned.
Despite the conventional wisdom to the contrary, Bell’s
reasoning is not uniquely applicable to hidden variable
theories or any other particular kind of theory. Rather
it is a way of teasing out the implications of any theory
that is assumed to be both complete and local. If we use
the Einstein’s Boxes scenario, this reasoning (applied to
quantum theory without any hidden variables) provides
yet another way to establish Einstein’s dilemma: quan-
tum theory either violates relativity’s demand for local-
ity/separability or is incomplete.46
Note that this Bell-inspired argument for the quan-
tum completeness-locality dilemma relies on definitions
of completeness and locality that are different from those
encountered in Secs. II and III. Locality is defined here
formally in terms of the stochastic irrelevance (or redun-
dancy) of facts that are outside the past light cone of
a given event: P (N2 = 1 |N1 = 1, λ) = P (N2 = 1 |λ).
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And completeness here amounts to the standard asser-
tion that the probability of detecting a particle is given
by the absolute square of the wave function, and that this
probability cannot be accounted for by ignorance regard-
ing any additional hidden variables – i.e., that there is
nothing other than the value of λ in B2 that determines
the probability for detecting a particle there.47
We return then to the earlier point about the use of
Bell’s theorem as an argument against the hidden vari-
ables program (that is, its use as an argument for the
orthodox completeness doctrine). It seems that we need
to reconsider the implications of Bell’s theorem when it
is combined with the completeness-locality dilemma. If
Bohr can be considered to have adequately refuted the
argument for this dilemma, that is, if quantum mechan-
ics can be validly interpreted as both complete and local,
then Bell’s theorem would indeed argue strongly against
any attempt to supplement the theory with additional
variables. But what if (perhaps motivated by Einstein’s
Boxes) we regard Bohr’s response as inadequate? That
is, what if we agree with Einstein that a dilemma between
locality and completeness exists for quantum theory?
There seem to be two options. We might choose to
regard the quantum theory as complete but non-local.
But then we are no longer in a position to use the required
non-locality of hidden variable theories (required, that
is, by Bell’s theorem) as a reason to dismiss them. If
non-locality is unacceptable to physical theories, not just
Bohm’s theory (for example), but quantum theory itself
would have to be dismissed as in conflict with relativity
theory.
Perhaps we are therefore tempted to back up and take
the other horn of the dilemma – to regard quantum me-
chanics as local but incomplete. But then it seems clear
that we ought to attempt to complete it, presumably by
adding hidden variables (which, it turns out, will have to
be non-local).
Either way, Bell’s theorem ceases to be a valid argu-
ment against the hidden variables program – a conclusion
opposite the standard interpretation of Bell’s result.
If the argument for the locality-completeness dilemma
is sound – and I think the various formulations in terms of
Einstein’s Boxes make this argument rather compelling
compared to the original EPR argument – then Bell’s re-
sult turns into a powerful argument in favor of taking se-
riously non-local hidden variable theories like Bohm’s.48
V. HEISENBERG, LOCALITY, AND
EXPERIMENTAL METAPHYSICS
Heisenberg also discussed something like Einstein’s
Boxes: “. . . one other idealized experiment (due to Ein-
stein) may be considered. We imagine a photon which
is represented by a wave packet built up out of Maxwell
waves. It will thus have a certain spatial extension and
also a certain range of frequency. By reflection at a semi-
transparent mirror, it is possible to decompose it into
two parts, a reflected and a transmitted packet. There is
then a definite probability for finding the photon either in
one part or in the other part of the divided wave packet.
After a sufficient time the two parts will be separated
by any distance desired; now if an experiment yields the
result that the photon is, say, in the reflected part of the
packet, then the probability of finding the photon in the
other part of the packet immediately becomes zero. The
experiment at the position of the reflected packet thus
exerts a kind of action (reduction of the wave packet)
at the distant point occupied by the transmitted packet,
and one sees that this action is propagated with a velocity
greater than that of light.”49
There are several interesting points to note. First,
Heisenberg converted the Boxes thought experiment into
a more realistic (and experimentally realizable; see the
following) situation where the carrying apart of two half-
boxes is replaced by the natural motion of a particle after
being either transmitted or reflected by a half-silvered
mirror. Second, it is interesting that Heisenberg seemed
to accept the dilemma between locality and complete-
ness that Einstein’s argument is intended to establish
and to favor the “complete but non-local” response to
that dilemma.
Yet as he claimed in the sentence just following the
previous quote, the admitted “action at a distance” that
is exerted by the nearby experimental apparatus doesn’t
lead to a contradiction with relativity: “However, it is
also obvious that this kind of action can never be utilized
for the transmission of signals so that it is not in conflict
with the postulates of the theory of relativity.”49
So evidently Heisenberg’s position was to concede to
Einstein that quantum mechanics was non-local, but to
deny that its particular type of non-locality was at odds
with relativity’s prohibitions on superluminal causation.
(This view is widely held and was eloquently advocated
recently by Abner Shimony50 who described the situa-
tion as a “peaceful coexistence” between quantum non-
locality and relativity.51) The tacit premise here is that
the only kind of superluminal causation that relativity
theory forbids is the kind that can be used “for the trans-
mission of signals.”
This particular attempt to wriggle free of the dilemma
was assessed by Bell:
“Do we then have to fall back on ‘no signaling
faster than light’ as the expression of the fun-
damental causal structure of contemporary
theoretical physics? That is hard for me to
accept. For one thing we have lost the idea
that correlations can be explained, or at least
this idea awaits reformulation. More impor-
tantly, the ‘no signaling’ notion rests on con-
cepts which are desperately vague, or vaguely
applicable. The assertion that ‘we cannot sig-
nal faster than light’ immediately provokes
the question:
Who do we think we are?
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We who can make ‘measurements’, we who
can manipulate ‘external fields’, we who can
‘signal’ at all, even if not faster than light?
Do we include chemists, or only physicists,
plants, or only animals, pocket calculators,
or only mainframe computers?”52
In addition, Heisenberg’s move here undermines one
of the principal arguments against non-local hidden vari-
able theories like Bohm’s. For although that theory does
include non-local, action-at-a-distance effects, these ef-
fects (just like the similar effects Heisenberg concedes
are present in orthodox quantum mechanics) cannot be
used to transmit signals. In Bohm’s theory this inability
arises from the inevitable uncertainty about the initial
locations of particles within their guiding waves. So if,
as Heisenberg argues, it is only the possibility of send-
ing superluminal signals that conflicts with relativity, we
must evidently conclude that Bohm’s theory and ortho-
dox quantum mechanics enjoy an equally peaceful coex-
istence with it.53
Let us finally return to the previous comment about
the apparent experimental realizability of the Heisenberg
version of Einstein’s Boxes. According to John Clauser,55
Schro¨dinger was intrigued by the clarity with which
Einstein’s Boxes brought out the locality-completeness
dilemma for quantum theory, and persuaded A´da´m,
Ja´nossy, and Varga (AJV) to perform Heisenberg’s ver-
sion of the experiment.54 Let us quote from Clauser’s
description of the AJV experiment:
“In their experiment, two independent photo-
detectors are placed respectively in the trans-
mitted and reflected beams of a half-silvered
mirror. If photons have a particle-like charac-
ter, that is, if their detectable components are
always spatially bounded and well localized,
then photons impinging on the half-silvered
mirror will not be split in two at this mirror.
On the other hand, if they are purely wavelike
in nature, (as with classical waves) then they
can and will be split into two independent
classical wave packets at the mirror. This
fact then implies that if they are purely wave-
like (in this classical sense), then the two de-
tectors will show coincidences when a single
temporarily localized photon is directed at
said mirror. One of these independent wave
packets will be transmitted to illuminate the
first detector, and the other will be reflected
to illuminate the second detector, and both
detectors will then have a finite probability
of detecting the same photon (classical wave
packet) . . . [AJV] found no such anomalous
coincidences, and thereby concluded that . . .
photons do not split at the mirror and thus
do exhibit a particle-like character.”55
Note that this experiment is precisely an empirical test
of Eq. (8) . Although the outcome of the experiment is
not surprising to anyone today, it is hoped that the pre-
ceding discussion underlines the apparent implications of
this outcome: if we accept the locality principle, we must
evidently conclude that photons56 do not split at the mir-
ror, but instead choose one or the other path exclusively.
That is, we must conclude that the quantum mechanical
description of the photon before detection,
ψ =
1√
2
(ψ1 + ψ2), (9)
is incomplete because it fails to attribute a definite posi-
tion to the particle.
Alternatively, we could uphold the completeness of the
wave function description by denying the locality premise
and regarding the collapse of the wave function on mea-
surement as describing a real physical change in the state
of the distant packet’s referent.
There is thus an interesting parallel between the AJV
experiment and the recent experimental tests of Bell’s
inequalities.39 Because Bell’s inequality represents a con-
straint on local hidden variable theories, empirical viola-
tions of the inequalities imply that local hidden variable
theories aren’t empirically viable. Likewise, Eq. (8) rep-
resents a constraint on a local version of quantum theory
(assumed complete). So the AJV finding that this con-
straint is violated has implications paralleling those of the
Bell tests: the local version of quantum theory (assumed
complete) is not empirically viable. Either locality or the
orthodox completeness assumption must be abandoned.
This conclusion is not new, but the same dilemma we
have seen now several times.
The extent to which orthodox quantum theory and
the hidden variable alternatives are on equal footing is
striking: local versions of each are evidently refuted by
experiment.57 Thus it seems the program of “experimen-
tal metaphysics” (to use one of Shimony’s apt phrases50)
began more than 30 years before the recent tests of Bell’s
inequality.
VI. DISCUSSION
We have presented several different formulations and
revisions of the argument that Einstein first presented at
the 1927 Solvay conference. The goal of this argument in
all of its versions is to establish an inconsistency between
the following two claims:
• The quantum mechanical description of reality is
complete.
• Quantum mechanics describes a world with only
local interactions.58
Although the various formulations of the argument differ
slightly in terms of logical structure and definitions of key
terms, they point to the same conclusion and ultimately
pivot around the same fulcrum: the collapse of the wave
function.
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The collapse rule itself is absolutely essential to the
quantum formalism, as evidenced, for example, by the
derivation of Eq. (8) and the subsequent discussion in
Sec. IV. However, the exact meaning of the rule is some-
what opaque in the standard interpretation. The essen-
tial lesson of Einstein’s Boxes (and this is a point Einstein
seems to have understood quite clearly as early as 1927) is
that we face a very simple choice when it comes to inter-
preting the collapse. Either it represents a real, physical
change of the physical state of the affected system, or it
doesn’t.59 If it does represent such a physical disturbance,
this entails a non-local action-at-a-distance that seems to
conflict with relativity’s prohibition on superluminal cau-
sation. (Or, if the physical disturbance produced by the
collapse were to propagate from the measurement event
at a sub-luminal speed, the quantum predictions would
be empirically wrong in cases of spatially separated corre-
lations like those illustrated in the AJV experiment.) On
the other hand, if the collapse of the wave function does
not represent a physical change in the state of the real
system, then the quantum mechanical description must
be incomplete (in at least Einstein’s bijective sense). For
quantum theory would then attribute two distinct state
descriptions to one and the same physical state.
The orthodox claim, initiated by Bohr in his reply
to EPR, is that quantum mechanics is both complete
and local. On further scrutiny, however, it seems this
claim can be maintained only with a kind of double-speak
about the collapse postulate. To protect the complete-
ness claim, the collapse must be interpreted as a real
physical state change, usually backed up by some ver-
sion of the disturbance theory of measurement.60 On the
other hand, the locality claim can be defended only by in-
terpreting the wave function collapse as merely a change
in knowledge.61
This double-speak was perhaps first identified by Ein-
stein. In the 1935 letter to Schro¨dinger that was dis-
cussed earlier, Einstein wrote: “The talmudic philoso-
pher doesn’t give a hoot for ‘reality’, which he re-
gards as a hobgoblin of the naive, and he declares that
the two points of view differ only as to their mode of
expression.”62 The “Talmudist” here is Bohr, and the
“two points of view” are the two interpretations of the
boxes discussed previously. But these interpretations
map precisely onto the two just-mentioned interpreta-
tions of wave function collapse. If, on the one hand, the
wave function description is incomplete (Interpretation 1
from Sec. III), then the collapse postulate can be safely
interpreted as merely updating our knowledge. But if,
on the other hand, the wave function description is re-
garded as complete (Interpretation 2), then the collapse
must represent a real physical change in the state of the
system.
Evidently Einstein believed that the claim that wave
function collapse represents a physically real change of
state, and the claim that it represents a mere change
in knowledge, do not “differ only as to their mode of
expression.”
Of course, the existence of a clean distinction between
these two views of wave function collapse presupposes
a realist philosophy that Bohr and many of his follow-
ers deny (or even claim to have refuted). Bohr, for ex-
ample, is said to have declared that “there is no quan-
tum world.”63 Although this anti-realist attitude contin-
ues to receive lip service, it seems that most physicists
don’t take the literal denial of a quantum world very
seriously.64 Most of us believe in the real existence of
atoms, electrons, and other sub-atomic particles. What-
ever strange quantum properties they may have, surely
there is a “they” that have them.
We will by no means resolve the debate about realism
here. But it is important to recognize that anti-realism
is not a sensible response to the alleged incompatibility
of the completeness and locality claims. It is, rather, a
wholesale denial of the very issues of completeness and
locality: there is no sense, for example, to a claim that
there is no quantum world, but quantum mechanics pro-
vides a complete description of it.65
One cannot respond to Einstein’s dilemma by claim-
ing that an anti-realist attitude warrants a simultaneous
belief in the completeness and locality of quantum me-
chanics. For according to the anti-realist attitude, there
is simply no such issue as completeness (there being no
quantum world for quantum mechanics to completely or
incompletely describe) and likewise no such issue as lo-
cality. This wholesale denial of the issues is not what
Bohr seems to have expressed explicitly, and it does not
seem consistent with the views of most contemporary de-
fenders of the Copenhagen interpretation who think, for
example, that locality is a meaningful and important re-
quirement for physical theories.
It is only from the point of view of the quantum realist
that these issues are meaningful; and from this point of
view, they are crucial and must be addressed before we
can claim to truly understand the meaning and status
of quantum theory. That is a program Einstein helped
initiate in the 1920s and, sadly, it is one that has been
largely abandoned by the physics community – no doubt
because many came to believe that the standard interpre-
tation was adequate on both counts. But, from the point
of view of Einstein, this adequacy was largely overesti-
mated: the standard interpretation of quantum theory
does suffer from a troubling dilemma, one with major
implications not only for the theory itself but also for
possible alternatives to or extensions of it. Indeed, when
combined with the empirical violations of Bell’s inequal-
ities, Einstein’s dilemma has major implications for our
understanding of nature.
It is fascinating that, after more than 75 years of
heated discussion, Einstein’s criticisms of the quantum
theory still seem effective and fresh. There is still much
work to be done before we achieve total clarity about the
foundations of quantum theory, the kind of clarity that
Einstein continuously sought. As we approach the cen-
tennial celebration of Einstein’s “miraculous year”, let
us acknowledge that Einstein still has much to teach us
13
about how this clarity can be achieved. It is hoped that
the Einstein’s Boxes argument in particular will continue
to stimulate further discussions on these fascinating and
important topics.
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